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ABSTRACT
In a series of papers Corazza & Dokic (Corazza 2007, 2009; Corazza & Dokic, 2007, 
2010, Dokic 2006) defended the view that the truth value of an utterance is relative 
to the situation vis-à-vis which it is evaluated. In the present essay I’ll show how this 
position, labeled “situated minimalism” (or more shortly “situationalism”) easily ge-
neralizes to deal with fictional discourse without having to commit ourselves to the 
existence of fictional characters, i.e. without assuming a realist position regarding 
fictional entities. In so doing, I’ll debunk some arguments that seem to favor a realist 
account and then show how negative existentials can be more easily dealt with wi-
thin an irrealist framework.
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Fictions, fictional Characters, existential Statements, gappy Propositions, Represen-
tations, Situations, Truth Conditions. 
 
1. Truth Conditions and Situations
A promising way to spell out a sentence’s truth conditions is to adopt the 
traditional, Tarski-inspired, truth-conditional framework. Thus the truth con-
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ditions of a simple sentence s can be represented by the T-schema:
(1) s is true if and only if p
With s standing for an object-language sentence and p for a sentence in the 
meta-language. Because natural languages like English, French, and Chinese 
include indexicals and other context-sensitive expressions, the T-schema (1) 
ought to be modified. Actually, if the sentence on the left hand of the bi-condi-
tional is a context sensitive one, e.g. “I am tired”, we end up with either: (i) “I 
am tired” is true iff NN is tired; or (ii) “I am tired” is true iff I am tired. If (i), 
the T-sentence is false for the majority of the occurrences of the object sen-
tence (e.g. when “I am tired” is not uttered by NN). If (ii), then the T-sentence 
is itself context-sensitive insofar as the meta-sentence on the right sight of the 
biconditional contains the indexical ‘I’. A natural strategy to circumvent the 
context sensitivity of natural language sentences within the T-schema, is to 
quantify over utterances and contextual features.1 We would thus have T-sen-
tences of the form:
(2) If u is an utterance of “I am tired” and x is the agent of u, then [u is true 
iff x is tired].
(3) If u is an utterance of “He/she is tired” and the agent of u refers to x with 
‘he/she’, then [u is true iff x is tired].
(4) If u is an utterance of “Today is sunny” and x is the day referred to by 
‘today’, then [u is true iff x is sunny].
In quantifying upon utterances and contextual features we can thus capture 
the context-sensitivity of natural language sentences.  Besides, to accommo-
date non-indexical, yet context sensitive sentences like:
(5) It’s raining.
(6) Jane is strong.
(7) Jeff is ready.
We can appeal to situations (see Corazza 2007, Corazza & Dokic 2007, 
2010). For utterances of these sentences are true/false only relative to a given 
situation. It may be raining in London while sunny in Barcelona, Jane may be 
1 I’m adopting Higginbotham’s (1988) formulation. See also Carston (2002: 50ff).
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strong for a 4-year-old child while not strong to enter a wrestling competition, 
and Jeff may be ready for the soccer game while not ready to get married. We 
have variegated situations vis-à-vis which a given statement can be judged as 
being true or false. 
In Barwise & Perry’s (1983) seminal work a situation is characterized as a 
partial possible world: “Reality consists of situations—individuals having 
properties and standing in relation at various spatiotemporal locations. We 
are always in situations; we see them, cause them to come about, and have 
attitudes toward them”. (Barwise & Perry 1983: 7).
Although a real situation (or a partial possible world) contains infinitely 
many aspects, human beings can cognize only parts of it. What agents end 
up cognizing depends on various factors such as their specific interests, the 
activities they are engaged in, their ordinary practices, the cultural or social 
background, and so on.2 Furthermore, the same individuals and properties 
can appear in different situations: they are uniformities across situations. Lo-
cations and times are uniformities as well: different things can happen in the 
same location at different times and various things can occur at the same time 
in different locations. To deal with fictional discourse we can also appeal to 
(partial) impossible worlds. For it is not uncommon to find contradictions and 
impossibilities within a novel, a movie, etc. Among the situations regarding 
which an utterance can be evaluated we should thus count situations contai-
ning contradictions as well. 
Furthermore, as we’ll see in section 3, situations can also be partially (or 
wholly) composed of representations classified by the linguistic meaning of 
the sentences used.
Following Barwise & Perry’s insights, a natural way to cash out the truth 
conditions of sentences like (5)-(7) is:3 
(8) If u is an utterance of “It’s raining” and s is the situation in which u occurs, 
then [u is true iff it is raining relative to s].
2 In saying that agents cognize situations I don’t mean, though, that they must be 
consciously aware or represent the situation in which they find themselves and within which 
their linguistic interchanges and/or thinking episodes occur. More on this later on.
3 For a detailed discussion see Corazza (2007) and Corazza & Dokic (2007, 2010).
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(9) If u is an utterance of “Jane is strong” and s is the situation in which u 
occurs, then [u is true iff Jane is strong relative to s].
(10) If u is an utterance of “Jeff is ready” and s is the situation in which u 
occurs, then [u is true iff Jeff is ready relative to s].
A similar picture can be proposed about other, apparently context insensi-
tive, sentences. To illustrate this, let us consider the following scenario. On 
Monday at 11:30 am John eats two scrambled eggs and at 12:00 am, to his 
partner’s question: “Did you have breakfast?” John replies: “I ate two scram-
bled eggs”. What John seems to imply is that he ate two scrambled eggs for 
breakfast that very day. Let us now consider another scenario. Two days later, 
on Wednesday, John has an upset stomach. He visits his doctor and to his 
doctor’s question, “Have you been infected by some food?” John utters the 
same sentence. What he now implies is that the scrambled eggs may be the 
cause of his stomach problems. Whether he had breakfast or not doesn’t enter 
the scene. Furthermore, John doesn’t seem to imply that he got the scrambled 
eggs that very same day, i.e. on Wednesday. In both scenarios John said the 
same thing, i.e. that he ate two scrambled eggs. It seems then that the very 
same state of the world, i.e. John having two scrambled eggs on Monday, 
and the very same proposition expressed, that he ate two scrambled eggs, can 
convey different messages. Let us now consider a further scenario. On Wed-
nesday, John utters: “I ate two scrambled eggs” in answering his partner’s 
question “Did you have breakfast?” John’s partner would again understand 
that John had two scrambled eggs for breakfast that very day. Yet, in that case 
we wouldn’t say that John is sincere if the egg-eating happened on Monday 
and not that very day. Yet, at first sight, it seems that John didn’t, strictly 
speaking, say something false. What he implies, though, is, to say the least, 
misleading. For, the message that his partner ends up computing—that John 
had breakfast because he ate two scrambled eggs—is far from accurate.
To summarize: the very same state of the world, the utterance of the same 
sentence, and the very same proposition: (i) can participate in conveying di-
fferent messages and, (ii) the same speaker in uttering the very same sentence 
can say something accurate or not. In answering: “I ate two scrambled eggs” 
to “Did you have breakfast?” on Monday John conveys something true, while 
on Wednesday he conveys something false. Yet John, strictly speaking, said 
the same thing, i.e. that he ate two scrambled eggs.4
4  I am here supposing that we don’t have hidden indexicals in John’s utterance con-
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As far as I can see, the best way to handle our scenarios (and to some extent 
to capture ordinary people’s intuitions) is to claim that by “I ate two scram-
bled eggs”, whether uttered on Monday or Wednesday in answering his part-
ner or his doctor, John expressed the proposition that he ate two scrambled 
eggs. The time of the eating remains unspecified. From a purely linguistic 
viewpoint what we have is that the proposition expressed must be evaluated 
regarding some past situations and, depending on the past situation vis-à-vis 
which the proposition is evaluated, John can either be blamed or praised for 
what he said. Yet, for John to be blamed or praised we should be capable of 
accusing him of saying something either true or false. A promising and in-
tuitive way to do so is to argue that with the very same sentence, in the very 
same context (agent, time, place, and possible world), one expresses a pro-
position that is either true or false only relative to the situation in which it is 
evaluated. In our scenarios, the very same state of the world, i.e. John eating 
two scrambled eggs on Monday, can participate in different situations. The 
latter, as I understand them, are cognitively and pragmatically determined by 
the broad context surrounding the whole linguistic and/or thinking episode.
By claiming that a situation is cognitively determined I don’t mean, though, 
that agents have to consciously select parts or aspects of it. It is natural to 
suppose that during a lunch situation, aspects of food and eating are raised to 
salience, while in a doctor’s office other aspects, having to do with medical 
treatments and illnesses, are raised to salience. Yet, this informational back-
ground upon which the linguistic and thinking episodes rest need not be cog-
nitively represented by the agents participating in it. In particular, our agents 
need not spend cognitive energy in selecting the relevant situation in which 
they find themselves: most of the time the relevant information contributing 
into a situation is automatically selected without cognitive effort. Thus, what 
one eats in the last few days may be relevant in the doctor situation, while the 
exact time of the eating may be more relevant in the lunch situation. There is 
lots of information stored in our surroundings, lots of general world knowle-
dge, common activities, expectations, automatic assumptions, etc. affecting 
our everyday practices.5 It shouldn’t be surprising that all these variegated 
tributing unmentioned elements into the proposition expressed. I am also supposing that we 
don’t have processes of free enrichment at work making John express different propositions 
in the various scenarios discussed. In other words, I am supporting a minimalist position on 
what is said. For discussion and criticism of the indexicalist and the free enrichment positions 
see Corazza & Dokic (2007, 2010).
5 Recent studies (e.g.: Bargh & Chartrand 2005) on social cognition suggest that the 
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aspects can participate in raising to salience determinate aspects of the world 
and thus concur in selecting a situation vis-à-vis which a proposition can be 
evaluated. It is not, though, the job of the semanticist to spell out the exact as-
pects of the surrounding circumstances that participate in making a situation. 
From a semantic viewpoint all we can say is that a proposition is evaluated 
vis-à-vis a situation and that it’s the job of cognitive science, broadly unders-
tood, to shed light on how some aspects come into a situation while others 
don’t. From an intuitive standpoint we can at least venture to say that when 
one is asked whether he got breakfast, the time of the breakfast must concern 
the day of the question, while when one is asked whether one is vegan the 
time one may have eaten two scrambled eggs extends far behind the day of 
the question and, therefore, that different time-slots may enter the situation 
vis-à-vis which the proposition expressed by “I ate two scrambled eggs” must 
be evaluated.
To summarize: “I ate two scrambled eggs” is silent on the relevant time of 
the eating. All we gather from its literal meaning is that the speaker ate two 
scrambled eggs sometime in the past. The relevant time is not articulated in 
the utterance. It can be determined only by the circumstances surrounding the 
discourse. Hence, as it stands, an utterance of “I ate two scrambled eggs” is 
underdetermined regarding the period, or day, relative to which it is evalua-
ted.6 The very same sentence uttered at the very same time and location can 
great majority of our everyday life isn’t determined by conscious intentions and delibera-
te choices. Most of our mental processes are triggered by features of the environment and 
operate outside our conscious awareness and guidance. It obeys what Glenberg & Kaschak 
(2002) characterize as ACE, i.e. the action-sentence compatibility effect: “[L]anguage com-
prehension is grounded in the same neuronal systems that are used to perceive, plan, and 
take action in the external world. In this way, the comprehension of language involves the 
vicarious experiencing of people, objects, emotions, and events that are described in the text. 
More broadly, just as our ability to plan and take action in the world relies on the ability to 
anticipate likely changes that will occur in the environment, we argue that an essential part 
of language comprehension process is the ability to anticipate what is coming next, both in 
the linguistic input and in the situations that are being described. This process of presonance 
is immediate and effortless. It allows us to resituate ourselves and vicariously experience 
(and learn from) events that have happened in situations other than the one we currently find 
ourselves in” (Zwaan & Kaschak 2009: 377).  For a more detailed discussion of these aspects 
and how they support situationalism, see Corazza (2011).
6 The position I’m proposing should be neutral on whether one accepts a temporalist 
or an eternalist view on time, i.e. whether we quantify over time or make reference to parti-
cular times. In other words, the position I’m defending is neutral on whether the proposition 
expressed by “I ate two scrambled eggs” with respect to a context C whose time is T is so-
mething like this (where NN is the referent of ‘I’ in C):  NN ate two scrambled eggs at some 
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be sensitive to different situations and it will be true/false only regarding the 
situation vis-à-vis which the proposition expressed is evaluated.
2. Fictional Discourse, Realism, and Irrealism
The truth conditional framework spelled out in the previous section naturally 
applies to fictional discourse. Or so I’m going to argue. 
To begin with we must distinguish between two different types of fictional 
discourse:
 
Discourse about fictional works.
Discourse within the fictional work. 
The first kind of discourse is, for instance, the discourse critical theorists en-
gage in when discussing, say, a given novel. The second kind of discourse 
concerns the discourse happening within the fiction. Thus, if a critical theorist 
says: 
(11) Conan Doyle created the famous detective Sherlock Holmes.
She is talking about Doyle’s fictional creation. This is a discourse about Do-
yle’s fictions. If, on the other hand, in reading one of Doyle’s novels, we 
encounter:
(12) Holmes asked Watson to buy pipe tobaccos.
We have a discourse within the fiction. While (11) concerns Doyle’s novel 
and his fictional creation, (12) is about a (fictional) event happening within 
the fiction. In expressing (11) our critical theorist is ontologically commit-
ted to the existence of Doyle’s fiction. In reading (12), though, one doesn’t 
commit oneself to the existence of Holmes, Watson, and the event described. 
While (11) could be paraphrased somewhat as:
(13) There is a novel created by Doyle in which Holmes is (represented as) a 
time prior to T, or whether the relevant proposition corresponds to something like NN ate two 
scrambled eggs at T*, and T* is prior to T.
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famous detective.
(13) Could be paraphrased as:
(14) There is a novel in which Holmes asked Watson to buy pipe tobaccos.
(13) and (14) are both ontologically committed to the existence of a novel as a 
fictional creation: we say that there is a novel. They are not committed, thou-
gh, to the existence of Holmes and Watson. To borrow Frege’s (1892) famous 
terminology we can say that the subject matter in (11) is Doyle creating the 
famous fictional detective, it is a fictional creation, while in (12) the subject 
matter is the fictional character asking his assistant to buy pipe tobaccos. Yet 
both (11) and (12), although in different ways, concern the novel. While (11) 
is about the creation of the novel, (12) is about what happens within the novel.
The distinction between discourse about fictional works and discourse wi-
thin fictional works allows us to bring forward the view that although one 
can commit oneself to realism about fictions, one need not be a realist about 
fictional characters. In other words, fictions are real entities inhabiting our 
world: they exist as abstract entities on a par with musical compositions and 
architectural projects. On the other hand, fictional characters like Holmes, 
Hamlet, and Melody Nelson7 don’t exist: we don’t have to be realists about 
their existence. We cannot meet Holmes and offer him tobaccos and we can-
not invite Melody Nelson for a dance as we can offer tobaccos to our neigh-
bor or invite Lady Gaga for a dance. To be sure, no one I know ever claimed 
that Holmes and Melody Nelson have the same ontological status as our nei-
ghbors or Lady Gaga.
Philosophers who are realist about fictional characters tend to argue that they 
exist as abstract entities, on a par with numbers and other abstract creatures.8 
7 Melody Nelson is a fictional character mentioned by the French musician Serge 
Gainsbourg (see “La Ballade de Melody Nelson”).
8 The realists I have in mind who equate fictional characters to abstract entities are, 
for instance, Salmon (1998) and Predelli (2002). As Salomon puts it: “To be sure, wholly 
fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes, though real, are not real people, neither physical 
objects nor mental objects. Instead they are, in this sense, abstract entities. They are not 
eternal entities, like numbers; they are man-made artifacts created by fiction writers.” (Sal-
mon; 1998: 293). Other forms of realism can be found in people inspired by Meinong. For a 
detailed discussion of the variegated forms of realism see, for instance, Voltolini (2006) and 
Sainsbury (2010).
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Thus as we cannot encounter and shake the hand of an abstract entity we 
cannot encounter and shake Holmes’ or Melody Nelson’s hand. An abstract 
entity’s existence is independent of space and time. Yet it is a real entity inha-
biting our world. And the story often goes: in creating a fiction qua abstract 
entity an author also creates the characters inhabiting the fiction qua abstract 
entities. More on this later on.
Among the arguments favoring realism about fictional characters we find the 
following. For :
(15) Holmes is a pipe smoker.
To be true (or false), ‘Holmes’ must be a referring expression. Hence, Holmes 
must exist as the bearer of ‘Holmes’. For, if ‘Holmes’ doesn’t refer, then (15) 
cannot be judged as being true or false. It would be truth valueless.9 A way out 
of this problem is to distinguish between truth and faithfulness, i.e. between 
being true and being faithful. Thus, although (15), as it stands, cannot be jud-
ged to be true or false, it can be judged to be either faithful or unfaithful to the 
Holmes stories. As Sainsbury points out (2010: 26), no one would take (15) as 
being really true. Holmes, as an abstract entity, cannot smoke a pipe. At best 
he smokes an abstract pipe. But what does it means to smoke an abstract pipe?
Sainsbury (2010) suggests that we should recognize two kinds of truth. On 
top of an absolute truth we should have a notion of truth relative to a presu-
pposition or pretense. The basic idea is that in a sentence like (15) ‘Holmes’, 
a well-known name for a fictional character, brings in the presupposition that 
(15) concerns the Holmes fictional stories and, thus, that the truth or falsity of 
(15) concerns the relevant stories. 
Within the framework I proposed in the previous section, we can adapt Sains-
bury’s suggestion and argue that in the case of empty names what we end up 
having are not propositions properly thought. If one is keen on a Millian pic-
ture concerning proper names and holds that the semantic content of a proper 
name is just its referent, one is likely to accept that with a simple sentence 
like: 
9 To be brief and for argument’s sake I am ignoring the likes of Frege (1884) and 
Strawson (1950) who hold the view that statements incorporating empty terms lack truth 
value.
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(16) Doyle smokes a pipe.
We express the singular (or Russellian) proposition having Doyle himself 
and the property of smoking a pipe as constituents. Thus, the proposition 
expressed by an utterance of (16) has as constituents the referent of the name 
‘Doyle’ and the property picked out by the verb phrase ‘smokes a pipe’. In 
set-theoretic terms we can represent it as an ordered couple of the form:
(17) <Doyle; being-a-pipe-smoker>
This proposition is true if Doyle instantiates the property of smoking a pipe 
and false otherwise. If one accepts, as I do, that empty names lack a semantic 
value, one is likely to either reject Millianism concerning empty names or to 
argue that the utterance of a sentence like:
(18) Holmes smokes a pipe.
Doesn’t express a proposition. One way out of this dilemma is to adopt a sug-
gestion made by Kaplan (1989) and claim that an utterance involving an emp-
ty name expresses a gappy proposition, i.e. a proposition having an empty 
slot as a constituent where the referent of the name would ordinarily appear. 
The gappy proposition expressed by (18) can be represented by the ordered 
couple:10
(19) <___; being-a-pipe-smoker>
(19) Misses a constituent in the position normally occupied by the semantic 
content of a name. Yet, it is a plausible Millian candidate for the semantic 
content of sentences that contain non-referring names. A gappy proposition 
can be believed and asserted. Little children can believe and assert that Santa 
comes down the chimney with presents on Christmas Eve. What they belie-
ve and assert is the gappy proposition having an empty slot in the place that 
would be occupied by the referent of ‘Santa’ if it wasn’t an empty name.
At first sight, it seems that a consequence of the gappy propositions view 
is that, contrary to intuition, “John believes that Santa smokes a pipe” and 
“Jane believes that Holmes smokes a pipe” attribute to John and Jane the 
10 For a discussion and defense of gappy propositions see Braun (1993, 2005).
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same belief insofar as they are both related to the same gappy proposition: 
<___; smoking-a-pipe>. Hence: either believing is not (merely) a relation to 
a proposition, or propositions are not, as commonly assumed, the objects of 
propositional attitudes. If, as I argued in the previous section, propositions are 
evaluated vis-à-vis a situation, then John and Jane’s beliefs are not co-situa-
ted. John’s belief that Santa smokes a pipe concerns Santa stories, while Ja-
ne’s belief that Holmes smokes a pipe concerns Doyle’s stories. Thus, John’s 
and Jane’s attitudes concern different situations and for this very reason their 
rational behavior is likely to differ. In other words, although John and Jane 
may be related with the same gappy proposition, their beliefs being situated in 
different situations may trigger different behaviors. John would, for instance, 
express his belief by uttering “Santa smokes a pipe”, while Jane would ex-
press her belief in saying “Holmes smokes a pipe”.
Furthermore, according to the picture I have in mind, attitude ascriptions 
aren’t exhausted by the relation the attribute entertains with a proposition. If 
this were the case “John believes that Santa is a detective” and “John believes 
that Holmes is a detective” couldn’t differ in truth value insofar as John is re-
lated to the very same gappy-proposition. The same, or similar enough story 
can be told about “Jane believes that Cicero is an orator” and “Jane believes 
that Tully is an orator”. Both ascriptions relate Jane with the same proposition 
<Tully/Cicero; being-an-orator>. Yet Jane is related with this proposition in 
different ways and, therefore, she is in different mental states she could ex-
press using “Tully is an orator” and “Cicero is an orator” respectively. Jane 
may accept one of these sentences as true, while doubting or rejecting the 
other as true. In short, the attitude relation John entertains with the gappy-pro-
position <___; being-a-detective> is mediated by John being in different 
mental states, i.e. the ones he would articulate using “Santa is a detective” 
and “Holmes is a detective”, respectively. If we take these two sentences as 
classifying John’s way of believing the same gappy-proposition and argue 
that John’s ways of believing a proposition affect the truth-condition of the 
belief ascription, then “John believes that Holmes is a detective” may be true, 
while “John believes that Santa is a detective” may be false. Thus, even if one 
were to argue that the relevant situation vis-à-vis which the gappy-proposi-
tion <___; being-a-detective> is evaluated doesn’t change, e.g. because the 
attributer may select the very same situation, the two ascriptions can differ in 
truth-conditions even if the that-clauses express the very same proposition.11 
11 Concerning attitudes ascriptions, in general, and the semantics of that-clauses, in 
particular, one could argue that one’s belief state is not exhausted by one being related to a 
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Another related consequence of the gappy propositions view is that all the 
utterances of the form “NN is F” having in subject position an empty term and 
in predicate position the same predicate express the very same gappy propo-
sition. Thus an utterance of “Holmes smokes a pipe” expresses the same (ga-
ppy) proposition as an utterance of “Santa smokes a pipe”. The question we 
now face concerns their truth value. Following the Frege-inspired traditions, 
propositions are the primary bearer of truth value. Thus, given that Tully is 
Cicero, “Tully is Roman” and “Cicero is Roman”, cannot differ in truth value 
insofar as they express the very same singular proposition.
Similarly, if utterances of “Santa smokes a pipe” and “Holmes smokes a pipe” 
express the same (gappy) proposition, they cannot differ in truth value. Sin-
ce we don’t have an individual instantiating the property of smoking a pipe, 
they are both false. At first sight, this looks problematic insofar as it doesn’t 
seem to capture our every day intuitions.12 One may be keen to reject as false 
“Santa smokes a pipe” while not being so keen in rejecting “Holmes smokes 
a pipe”, for in Doyle’s story, unlike the Santa stories, Holmes is represented 
as a pipe smoker. I’m not sure how much weight we should put on speakers’ 
intuitions concerning the truth or falsity of utterances involving empty terms. 
I guess that ordinary speakers are likely to be confused when asked about the 
truth and/or falsity of sentences involving empty terms. Yet, if we recognize 
a notion of truth relative to a fiction we can avoid committing ourselves to: 
(i) the existence (abstract or whatever) of fictional characters and (ii) to the 
view that all the utterances of sentences involving an empty term are false.13 
For, if we recognize that (15), like (18), is true/false only relative to a fiction 
we need not commit ourselves either to Holmes’ existence, or to the view 
that (15) and (18) are false. Holmes’ “existence” is confined to the world of 
proposition. One is related to a proposition in a certain way. Thus John and Jane may be rela-
ted to the very same proposition in different ways. E.g. by being in mental states they would 
express by using respectively “Santa smokes a pipe” and “Holmes smokes a pipe”. It is their 
different mental states and not the object of their beliefs that cause them to engage in different 
behaviors. For a defense of this view see, for instance, Brown (2002, 2005), Corazza (1994, 
2004).
12 See Braun (1993, 2005) for a plausible defense of the view that gappy propositions 
are false and Braun (2005) for a discussion on how we can deal with ordinary speakers’ in-
tuitions without giving up the view that gappy propositions are false.
13 It may be worth stressing that if one holds that utterances of sentences with empty 
terms are always false, then a sentence like “Holmes has been created by Doyle” is, contrary 
to our intuitions, false.
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fiction. Actually, from:
(20) In Doyle’s story (Ǝx) (x = Holmes & Fx)
We cannot infer:
(21) (Ǝx) (x = Holmes & in Doyle’s story Fx)14
While (20) can be true/false insofar as it is faithful to Doyle’s story or not, 
(21) cannot be true. In short, we cannot quantify into a story, unless the story 
concerns real characters, events, etc. that have been incorporated into the 
story. In (20), unlike (21) the existential quantifier doesn’t range over entities 
inhabiting the real world. While the domain of the quantifier in (21) is the ac-
tual world, the domain of the quantifier in (20) are Doyle’s stories concerning 
Holmes. This is tantamount to the classical de re/de dicto distinction.
In support of this view we can appeal to the following intuition. From “Jane 
imagined a unicorn flying on campus” we cannot infer that there is a unicorn 
Jane imagined to be flying on campus. First of all, Jane is unlikely to have had 
a specific unicorn in mind: how could she? Yet in her imagination Jane had a 
representation of some, unspecific, unicorn. The same with Doyle: in writing 
about Holmes it is likely that he didn’t have a specific individual in mind, as 
if he were writing a roman-à-clef. If we were to infer (21) from (20), though, 
we would repudiate this platitude.
In saying that Holmes exists, one is talking loosely. All one would be actually 
saying or at least implying is that according to Doyle’s stories there is Holmes 
or, better, that in the story Holmes is represented as such and such. With (15) 
and (18) we are simply stating that according to the Holmes stories Holmes, 
the fictional character, is represented as being a pipe smoker. But in claiming 
that a fictional character is represented as a pipe smoker we don’t commit 
ourselves to the view either that Holmes exists or that ‘Holmes’ is a referring 
expression.15 Although a representation has some representational content, it 
14 Doyle’s stories are not romans-à-clef with a real character incorporated into the 
novel. That is, Doyle is not writing a novel concerning, say, Julius Cesar or Napoleon.
15 As Sainsbury puts it: “It is uncontroversial that there are fictional characters, but it is 
far from uncontroversial that these are species of entities … it may be that ‘there are fictional 
characters’ is just another way of saying that there are works of fiction in which characters 
are portrayed, and although this entails that works of fiction really exist, it does not entail that 
characters really exist” (Sainsbury 2005: 209).
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need not have an entity it represents. In hallucinating a unicorn attacking me I 
entertain a thought representing a unicorn. Yet there is no unicorn my thought 
is about. My representation may trigger all kinds of behaviors and emotions 
without there being an object it is about. The same with a fictional charac-
ter like Holmes. Think, for instance, of the Santa Claus representations and 
the children’s behaviors they trigger. In saying “My son believes that Santa 
comes down the chimney on Christmas Eve”, I don’t commit myself to the 
existence of Santa. Yet, like my son, I entertain a Santa-representation or, as 
Frege would put it, a mode of presentation16.
Another related problem of the gappy-propositions view is that sentences 
containing fictional names that explicitly mention the story like “In Doyle’s 
story, Holmes is a detective” and “In Doyle’s stories, Santa is a detective” 
express the same gappy-proposition. Yet one is true while the other is false. 
A way out of this problem is to equate stories with situations. While the latter 
are partial possible worlds determined (or built up) by individuals and pro-
perties/relations, the former are partial possible worlds built up by represen-
tations or, as Frege would put it, by modes of presentation. So, while it is true 
that in Doyle’s story there are representations of Holmes being a detective, 
it is false that in Doyle’s stories there are representations of Santa being a 
detective. The representations constituting a story are the ones described and 
characterized by the author of the story. Besides, if we accept what Evans 
(1982) characterizes as the incorporation principle, i.e. the view that we can 
incorporate into a fiction facts not mentioned by the author that haven’t been 
previously ruled out, we can deal with fictional sentences such as: “In Doyle’s 
story, Holmes has three ears”. Although Doyle never mentions the number of 
ears that Holmes has we can incorporate into the fiction typical features of hu-
man beings. We can thus characterize this sentence as false insofar as Holmes 
is represented as a human being with all known human characteristics, such 
as having two ears, two eyes, two legs, a heart, and ten fingers.
In a fiction one can talk about a round square, the fountain of youth, the gol-
den-mountain, etc. Yet there’s no round square, as there is no fountain of you-
16 One way to capture what is going on in one’s mind when one entertains a repre-
sentation of, say, Santa or Holmes—like when one entertains a representation of an existing 
individual—is to appeal to the notion of mental file. One has in one’s mind a file one labels 
‘Santa’ in which one can store various information, such as he doesn’t exist, that he is be-
lieved by children to bring presents on Christmas eve, etc. Mental files as a way to describe 
how our mental life can be organized and how proper names play an important role in such 
organization has been proposed by Grice (1969) and refined by Perry (1980).
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th or golden-mountain. Just as a painting can represent angels and mermaids, 
a novel can represent them, without there being an existential commitment.
As I already mentioned, among the arguments favoring the existence of fic-
tional characters qua abstract entities, we have the following. Since fictions 
exist, and since we have fictional characters within the fiction, the latter exist 
just as the former: “But they [fictional characters] exist just as robustly as the 
fiction themselves, the novel, stories, etc. in which they occur. Indeed, fic-
tional characters have the same ontological status as fictions, which are also 
abstract entities created by the authors. And certain things are true of these 
fictional characters”. (Salmon 1998: 293)
The main question we face can be formulated as follows: can one accept the 
existence of fictions, novels, etc. without accepting the existence of fictional 
characters? In other words, does the existence of fictions commit one to the 
existence of fictional characters as well? In slightly different terms: does an 
author creating a fiction qua abstract entity also create the fictional characters 
inhabiting it as abstract entities?
It seems uncontroversial that fictions, like musical compositions, exist. We 
can burn the books and the musical partitions, without destroying the novel 
and the composition. The same story can be written in Chinese, in Arabic, or 
French. So stories can be considered as abstract entities inhabiting our world. 
Yet, do we have to commit ourselves to the existence of the characters repre-
sented in the stories as well?
A realist about fictional characters is committed to the idea that fictional cha-
racters are constituents of stories. Yet, as Sainsbury correctly puts it, this idea 
should be dismissed:
It seems uncontroversial to say that stories represent people, places, 
events, and so on. But it’s hard to combine the view that X represents Y 
with the view that Y is a constituent of X. Words or thoughts represent 
objects or state of affairs; but the represented objects are not literally 
constituents of the words or thoughts that represent them: Fido is not 
a constituent of “Fido” and the state of affairs of Fido barking is not a 
constituent of the thought that Fido barks. (Sainsbury 2010: 33-4)17.
17 If thoughts were equated to singular propositions, then Fido would be the cons-
tituent of the thought that Fido barks. As we saw, though, we should distinguish between 
thoughts qua mental states having a causal power and the propositions (singular, gappy, or 
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As we cannot, strictly speaking, say that an object is a constituent of a repre-
sentation, we cannot say that a fictional character is a constituent of the fiction 
representing it. Holmes is not a constituent of Doyle’s stories. From the fact 
that Doyle’s stories represent Holmes we cannot infer that the latter exists as 
a constituent of the former. If one says that he has Lady Gaga in mind, what 
one says is that he has a (maybe vivid) representation of Lady Gaga. Lady 
Gaga cannot be literally in one’s mind. All we can have in our mind are re-
presentations.18
3. Negative Existentials, Realism, and Irrealism 
Among the advantages of the irrealist position vis-à-vis fictional characters 
we can mention the treatment of negative existentials. Consider:
(22) Holmes doesn’t exist.
If ‘Holmes’ is a referring term designating Holmes, (22) is false, for Holmes 
(though an abstract entity) exists. Besides, if (22) is false, “Holmes exists” 
must be true.19 If, on the other hand, one is an irrealist (22) delivers the right 
truth value. This result fits our every-day intuitions. (22) delivers the right 
truth value insofar as ‘Holmes’ is an empty term, i.e. a name which simply 
lacks a referent. If ‘Holmes’ has a referent (22) cannot be true. This is the 
famous puzzle of existence already mentioned by Plato, i.e. that what is not 
must in some sense be, for we are ascribing some character to it.20 As we 
saw, an utterance with an empty term in subject position expresses a gappy 
proposition. “Holmes exists”, “Santa exists”, and “Melody Nelson exists” 
all express the very same gappy proposition: <___; existing>. This gappy 
proposition is false insofar as Holmes, Santa, and Melody Nelson don’t exist. 
general) they represent.
18 For a criticism of the view that objects are constituents of representations (or mode 
of presentations), see Corazza’s (1994 and 2004, ch. 6) criticism of the neo-Fregean (Evans 
1982 and McDowell 1984) notion of de re senses and Russellian thoughts.
19 A way out of this problem could be to claim that a negative existential involving an 
empty name like (22) must be paraphrased as “Holmes is not real” or “Holmes doesn’t exist 
among the spatio-temporal individuals”.
20 See also Meinong’s distinction between existence and being (the category of being 
is the wider, embracing plenty of non-existent things): for Meinong everything which can be 
named has being but may lack existence.
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Thus, negative existentials like “Melody Nelson doesn’t exist” and “Santa 
doesn’t exist” are true. And this fits with our ordinary intuitions. A negative 
existential like (22) can be represented as the negation of a gappy proposi-
tion, i.e.: <<___; existing>; NEG>. If we accept, following Brown (2005), 
that all gappy propositions are false, then their negations must be true. This 
is the simple consequence of the trivial: P is true if and only if not-P is false. 
This, though, may not square with ordinary speakers’ intuitions. If “Holmes 
smokes a pipe” is false insofar as it expresses a gappy proposition, then “Hol-
mes doesn’t smoke a pipe” must be true. And this is something many may not 
be willing to swallow. Although one may be keen to say that Holmes doesn’t 
really exist and thus that he doesn’t really smoke a pipe, at the same time one 
is keen to say that in Doyle’s stories Holmes is (represented as) a pipe smoker. 
Once again, I think that if we take on board Sainsbury’s suggestion to distin-
guish between absolute truth and faithfulness, we come close to capturing 
ordinary speakers’ intuitions. I reckon that, as confused as they may be, if we 
asked ordinary people to explain how they think about sentences involving 
fictional characters they are likely to come out with paraphrases of the sort: 
“Well, although Holmes (unlike you and me) doesn’t exist, in Doyle’s stories 
he is represented as a pipe-smoker”. This can be cashed out along the lines of 
(20), which I repeat here:
(20) In Doyle’s story (Ǝx) (x = Holmes & Fx).
In (20) the existential quantifier doesn’t range over existing objects. All it 
comes to mean is that in the story someone is represented as Holmes and as 
being F. In other words, in the story we have representations allegedly stan-
ding for someone. All we are doing is acting as-if-someone were to exist and 
was doing such-and-such. We are not talking or thinking with an existential 
commitment. We are talking under a presupposition.
To stress this last point it is instructive to consider negative existentials invol-
ving count nouns such as:
(23) Unicorns don’t exist.
I know no one who would claim that unicorns exist and, therefore, no one 
who would deny the truth of (23). And, as our intuitions go, (23) is true in-
sofar as in our world we find no entity instantiating the property of being a 
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unicorn (roughly of being what we represent as a horse with a horn).21 Yet we 
don’t hesitate to argue that in some stories or myths unicorns are represented 
as horses with a horn. The very same, or a similar enough, intuition under-
lies our understanding of negative existentials with proper names in subject 
position. (22) is true because in our world no one happens to be Holmes, i.e. 
because no one happens to be the bearer of the name ‘Holmes’, i.e. because 
‘Holmes’ is an empty name22. With the same thought we can deal with appa-
rent contradictions like:
(24) Oedipus doesn’t exist; Oedipus is a mythical character.
In (24) we seem to claim both that Oedipus doesn’t exist and that he, although 
as a mythical entity, exists. If one is a realist about fictional and mythical enti-
ties, one needs to tell a story on how in (24) the two occurrences of ‘Oedipus’ 
can have different semantic values. For, in saying that Oedipus doesn’t exist 
one seems to commit oneself to the view that ‘Oedipus’ is an empty term and 
thus that it fails to refer. Yet in claiming that Oedipus is a mythical character 
a realist commits himself to the view that there is an abstract (or mythical) 
entity referred to by ‘Oedipus’. An easy way out of this problem would be 
to claim that we have two uses of ‘Oedipus’, i.e. that the name is ambiguous 
between being a referential term for an abstract entity and being an empty 
term. If one accepts the view I am proposing, though, one need not postulate 
an ambiguity in order to handle the problem. For, in saying that Oedipus is 
a mythical character what we are actually saying is that there are represen-
tations of Oedipus and that these representations are empty. Just as we have 
representations of unicorns we can have representations of Oedipus. There is 
no contradiction in claiming that Oedipus doesn’t exist and claiming that we 
have representations of Oedipus. Thus, there is no contradiction in saying that 
‘Oedipus’ doesn’t refer and that we have Oedipus-representations.
As I already suggested, the picture I am proposing allows situations to be 
composed, among other things (e.g. individual and relations), of representa-
tions. The latter can be compositionally characterized. To do so it suffices to 
adopt a pluri-propositions model along Perry’s (2001) critical referentialism 
21 For an argument along these lines see Sainsbury (2010: 48 ff) and Corazza (2009).
22 The ideas exposed here are reminiscent of the Fregean solution that considers exis-
tence to be a predicate of second order. Thus an existential like “Socrates exists” is analyzed 
as “(Ǝx)(x = Socrates)”. In his attempts to eliminate proper names Quine (1963) makes the 
further move and analyzed it as “(Ǝx)(x socratizes)”. Negative existentials like “Holmes 
doesn’t exist” would then be analyzed as “It is not the case that (Ǝx)(x holmenizes)”.
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and Korta & Perry’s (2011) critical pragmatics. In short, on top of the propo-
sition expressed (what Perry characterizes as the official content), an utteran-
ce comes equipped with various reflexive contents generated by the linguistic 
meaning of the sentence uttered. Thus, the utterance of an indexical sentence 
like “I’m happy”, on top of expressing the proposition having the speaker as 
a constituent, generates the reflexive content that the agent/speaker of “I’m 
happy” is happy. This content is reflexive insofar as it contains the utterance 
itself as a constituent. An utterance containing a referential proper name like 
“John Perry is happy”, expresses the singular proposition having John Perry 
and the property of being happy as constituents, and generates the reflexive 
content: “that the person the convention exploited by the utterance “John Pe-
rry is happy” permits one to designate with ‘John Perry’ is happy23.
In the case of empty names the relevant convention ends in what Donne-
llan (1974) characterizes as a block. Thus an utterance of “Holmes is happy” 
would express the gappy proposition having a slot in the place that would 
be occupied by the referent of ‘Holmes’ if it wasn’t an empty term and ge-
nerates the reflexive content that the individual the convention exploited by 
the utterance “Holmes is happy” permits one to designate with ‘Holmes’ is 
happy. Since this convention ends in a block, the official content is a gappy 
proposition. Yet its reflexive content is independent of Holmes’ existence: it 
is purely generated by the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered.24 The 
reflexive content of an utterance is what allows us to classify the mental states 
of the speakers and the various representations they would entertain. Thus 
23 In his referential-reflexive framework Perry recognizes many contents for an ut-
terance. On top of the official content, which captures the intuitive notion of what is said, 
Perry recognizes various reflexive truth conditions. The latter are inspired by Reichenbach’s 
token-reflexive treatment of indexical expressions. They are associated to utterances simply 
in virtue of the meaning of the sentence (the type) uttered and correspond to the conditions 
required for truth with various combinations of referential and contextual factors quantified 
over, rather than taken as fixed. According to Reichenbach, the meaning of an indexical such 
as ‘I’ is explained using a reflexive description of the form ‘the utterer of this token’ while the 
meaning of ‘you’ is explained as ‘the addressee of this token’. This conception was refined 
with Kaplan’s (1977) content/character distinction. The character (or linguistic meaning) of 
an indexical can be represented as a function taking as its argument the context and giving 
as its value the content or referent. Thus, the character of ‘I’ can be represented as ‘the agent 
of this utterance’ and the character of ‘you’ as ‘the addressee of this utterance’. In short, the 
character or linguistic meaning of an indexical is what a competent speaker/hearer masters.
24 Given that the reflexive content is provided by the literal meaning of the sentence 
used, it can be compositionally determined. Furthermore, it captures a speaker linguistic (se-
mantic) competence insofar as it is the minimal content one can grasp given one’s knowledge 
of the language.
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two speakers uttering “I’m happy” would express different propositions and 
be in the same type mental state, classified by the reflexive content that the 
utterer (agent) of it is happy, i.e. the mental state one expresses by uttering 
that sentence.
The distinction between official and reflexive content also allows us to deal 
with meta-fictional sentences such as: “Holmes is a fictional character” or 
“There are more fictional characters in Dante’s Hell than in Doyle’s The Ad-
venture of the Empty House”. These are true insofar as meta-fictional senten-
ces implicitly state that we are not dealing with real individuals. With “Hol-
mes is a fictional character” one implicitly states that ‘Holmes’ is an empty 
term and that the corresponding representation is also empty. The latter can be 
classified by the reflexive content i.e. something like: the convention allowing 
one to designate someone with ‘Holmes’ ends in a block. Since the relevant 
convention ends in a block the classified representation is empty. The same 
with “There are more fictional characters in Dante’s Hell than in Doyle’s The 
Adventure of the Empty House”, where the reflexive content classifying the 
relevant representation can be cashed out as: there are more naming-conven-
tions ending in a block in Dante’s Hell than in Doyle’s The Adventure of the 
Empty House.
Voltolini, though, argues that when we come to consider negative existentials 
a realist position vis-à-vis fictional characters presents advantages. Voltolini 
(2006: 90-91) invites us to consider sentences like: 
(25) There is no such thing as Santa Claus.
(26)  There is no such thing as Rudyard.
According to Voltolini, (25) is true insofar as it comes to mean that: “in the 
restricted domain of the spatiotemporal existents, the fictional object Santa 
Claus is not to be found” (Voltolini 2006: 90). On the other hand, (26) is true 
insofar as “we want to say that as no character by that name has ever been 
created through any make-believe process, within the overall domain of be-
ings no thing by that name can be found” (Voltolini 2006: 90). Voltolini is 
thus committed to the view that sentences like the following must be analyzed 
differently: 
(27) Santa Claus doesn’t exist.
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(28) Rudyard doesn’t exist.
(27) Comes to be paraphrased as saying that the fictional character (Voltolini 
calls it a fictum) Santa Claus doesn’t spatio-temporally exist, while (28) gets 
a meta-linguistic interpretation. It is considered to be equivalent to: 
(29) ‘Rudyard’ doesn’t refer to anything.   
The first question that springs to mind is why sentences like (27) and (28) 
must be analyzed differently. I can only think that an analysis that doesn’t 
consider (27) and (28) on a par is ad hoc.25 In other words, I have problems 
understanding how the literal meaning of sentences like (25)/(26) and (27)/
(28) can differ. I am also unable to see how a speaker can mean different 
things when uttering them. If we consider (27) and (28) they seem to be both 
of the form:
(30) NN doesn’t exist
That is, as negative existentials with a proper name in subject position. A sen-
tence like this would be true in the case NN doesn’t exist and false in the case 
she/he/it exists. The main question boils down to knowing how a sentence 
like (30) can be true. If we analyze (30) along the analysis Voltolini proposes 
for negative existentials involving names such as ‘Rudyard’, (30) would then 
be equivalent to:
(31) ‘NN’ doesn’t refer26.
 As far as I can see (27) is of the same form and comes to mean:
25 Voltolini (2009) argues that the difference in logical form is due to the fact that 
sentences involving ‘Rudyard’, unlike sentences involving ‘Santa’, are meaningless. I think, 
though, that for a sentence involving ‘Rudyard’ to be meaningless, ‘Rudyard’ could not be a 
proper name. But, couldn’t someone name his pet (or baby) ‘Rudyard’? I know a few Italians 
named ‘Otto’ (in Italian ‘otto’ means eight) and David Beckham just named his new baby girl 
‘Harper Seven’.
26 Adopting the pluri-propositions model inspired by Perry’s (2001) and Korta & Pe-
rry’s (2011) the reflexive content associated with the utterance of this sentence can be cha-
racterized as: The convention allowing one to refer to someone using ‘NN’ ends in a block. 
Thus, ‘NN’ doesn’t refer.
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(32) ‘Santa Claus’ doesn’t refer.
When a child comes to believe that Santa Claus doesn’t exist, there will be 
lot of related beliefs that she will put into question, such as the belief that 
someone living on the North Pole brings presents on Christmas Eve. The 
name ‘Santa Claus’ doesn’t stop being a proper name and being associated 
with some representations. Even if one knows that Santa Claus doesn’t exist 
and, therefore, that ‘Santa Claus’ is an empty name, one keeps having some 
notions or features in one’s mental file labeled by that name. One may not 
have many beliefs associated with names such as ‘Rudyard’. There’re some 
chances that one never came across such a name and, thus, that one has no in-
formation one can associate with that name. This doesn’t justify, though, the 
claim that (27) and (28) should be analyzed differently. The beliefs one can 
or cannot associate with a particular name should not determine our semantic 
analysis. As Kripke (1980) pointed out, one may have no information about 
Gellman or Feynman. Yet this doesn’t prevent one from using ‘Gellman’ and 
‘Feynman’. This doesn’t prevent one from engaging in a name-using practi-
ce. And one can do so by exploiting the reflexive content, i.e. that there is a 
convention allowing one to refer to x using ‘Gellman’. The same can be said 
about speakers using ‘Rudyard’. One can competently say that she knows 
nothing about Rudyard and that she even doubts he (or she?) existed.
My suspicion is that one ends up analyzing (27) and (28) differently insofar 
as one comes to the semantic task with an already made ontological theory in 
one’s semantic tool-box. In particular, I suspect that one aims to analyze (27) 
and (28) differently because one is already ontologically committed to the 
existence of fictional characters, i.e. because one is a realist regarding fictio-
nal characters. An analysis that doesn’t take (27) and (28) on a par, it seems 
to me, reverses the order of explanation. That is to say, one takes ontological 
categories to determine semantic categories. Shouldn’t it be, though, that it is 
for our semantics to determine what we should ontologically commit to and 
not vice versa?27 
4. Situationalism and Fictional Discourse
27 It is thus curious that Voltolini dismisses the non-committal theories, i.e. the theo-
ries that analyze fictional discourse without positing ficta, on the ground that they “fail to be 
semantically equivalent to the sentences they allegedly paraphrase” (Voltolini 2006: 129).
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Let us consider:
(33) Sherlock Holmes is a detective.
(34) Oedipus killed his father.
In adopting the framework proposed in the first section, the truth conditions 
of fictional sentences like these can be cashed out as follows:
(35) If u is an utterance of “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” and s is the situa-
tion in which u occurs, then [u is true iff Sherlock Holmes is a detective in s].
(36) If u is an utterance of “Oedipus killed his father” and s is the situation in 
which u occurs, then [u is true iff Oedipus killed his father in s]
In (35) and (36) the relevant situation in which the fictional-utterances must 
be evaluated corresponds to the story and myth. That is, the story and myth 
are the relevant situations vis-à-vis which (33) and (34) must be evaluated as 
being true/false.28 The situations vis-à-vis which an utterance can be evalua-
ted can be real or fictional. As such they can be constituted by real individuals 
and representations or merely by representations. 
When we consider meta-fictional sentences like:
(37) In Doyle’s stories Sherlock Holmes is a detective.
(38) In the Greek myth Oedipus loves Jocasta. 
28 What I am proposing here mirrors, to some extent, Lewis’s analysis: “Let us not take 
our descriptions of fictional characters at face value, but instead let us regard them as abbre-
viations for longer sentences beginning with an operator ‘In such-and-such fiction’ Such a 
phrase is an intensional operator that may be prefixed to a sentence ξ to form a new sentence. 
Consider these sentences:
 Holmes lived in Baker Street
 Holmes lived nearer Paddington Station than Waterloo Station
 Holmes was just a person—a person of flesh and blood
All of them are false if taken as unprefixed, simply because Holmes did not actually exist. … 
All are true if taken as abbreviations for prefixed sentences” (Lewis 1978: 262-3).
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The relevant situation with respect to which the utterance must be evaluated 
is explicitly expressed by the prefix “In Doyle’s stories” and “In the Greek 
myth”. Meta-fictional sentences mirror the form:
(39) In s [u] 
With s standing for the situation and u for the utterance appearing in that si-
tuation. As we saw, situations are partial possible worlds. Nothing prevents 
us from considering that some situations are not actual, i.e. are not part of the 
actual world. In that case the relevant situation is made up by (empty) repre-
sentations. (37) and (38) can be represented as:
(40) If u is an utterance of “In Doyle’s story, Sherlock Holmes is a detective”, 
then [u is true iff Sherlock Holmes is a detective in Doyle’s story].
(41) If u is an utterance of “In the Greek myth, Oedipus loves Jocasta”, then 
[u is true iff Oedipus loves Jocasta in the Greek myth].
The only difference I see between utterances like “In the fiction/myth/… Hol-
mes is F” and “Holmes is F” is that in the former the fictional operator is 
explicitly stated, while in the latter it’s implicit or unarticulated. Their truth 
value, though, is the same. The framework I proposed captures this differen-
ce, just as it captures the difference between “It’s raining” and “It’s raining 
here/in London”.
In the picture I am advocating, a statement like “Sherlock Holmes is a pipe 
smoker” is only true or false relative to a fiction, considered as a real (yet 
abstract) object. So the fiction is a parameter relevant to evaluating the tru-
th or falsity of the gappy proposition expressed by “Sherlock Holmes is a 
pipe smoker”. In the framework I am proposing, a gappy proposition, like 
any other proposition, is true/false only relative to a situation. It is on this 
particular feature that I claimed that fictional discourse mirrors non-fictional 
discourse. The following chart should summarize the main point:
(i) Non-Fictional Utterance  →           Proposition
 with proper name                 + 
              Situation  → Truth Value
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(ii) Fictional Utterance          →      Gappy Proposition
 with fictional name                       +
                   Fictional Situation  →   Truth value
Since existential (and negative existential) statements are non-fictional, they 
can express gappy propositions that are true/false relative to real situations. 
As we saw, “Santa exists” expresses the gappy proposition <__ , existence>, 
while the negative existential “Santa doesn’t exist” expresses: << __ , exis-
tence>NEG>. We can summarize this with the following chart:
(iii) Existential utterance             →         Gappy Proposition
 with empty name                          +
                Situation          →  False 
(iv) Neg-Existential utterance →    NEG [Gappy Proposition]
 with empty name              +
                        Situation           →  True 
Furthermore, the structure of (40) and (41) differs from the structure of (35) 
and (36) only inasmuch as the latter, unlike the former, specifies the situation 
with respect to which the relevant utterance must be evaluated. This captures 
and reflects the difference between what I characterized as discourse about 
the fiction and discourse within the fiction.
Among the advantages of the analysis proposed here we can mention that the 
truth conditions for fictional discourse like (35)/(36) and (40)/(41) encapsu-
late the intuitive idea that the truth concerning fictional discourse is best ex-
plained in terms of being faithful. The utterance of a sentence like “Sherlock 
Holmes is a pipe smoker” can be characterized as true insofar as it is faithful 
to Doyle’s stories. That is, insofar as it is evaluated vis-à-vis Doyle’s stories. 
That is, in virtue of Doyle’s stories representing Holmes as a pipe smoker. It 
is because in Doyle’s stories we have representations of Holmes as being a 
pipe-smoker that utterances of that sentence can be judged to be true relative 
to the stories.
Last, but not least, meta-fictional sentences and fictional ones, like ordinary 
sentences, do not force a switch of situation (or circumstance) when we come 
to evaluate utterances of them. The only difference is that in the case of me-
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ta-fictional sentences the relevant situation is explicitly stated, i.e. it is articu-
lated in the utterance itself by a locution of the form “In the story …” while 
in an ordinary sentence the relevant situation is unarticulated. This mirrors 
what happens with ordinary, non-fictional sentences like “It’s raining” and 
“It’s raining here”. In the former the relevant situation (location) is implicit 
and remains unarticulated, while in the latter it is articulated; it is referred to 
by ‘here’. What makes these utterances true/false is the very same situation 
whether the relevant location is articulated or not. In both “It’s raining” [utte-
red in London] and “It’s raining in London” the very same situation/location 
(i.e. London) can concur in making them true/false. The same happens with 
a fictional and a meta-fictional sentence. Both “Sherlock Holmes is a pipe 
smoker” and “In Doyle’s story, Sherlock Holmes is a pipe smoker” are true/
false regarding the very same situation, i.e. Doyle’s story. 
 
We are thus in a position to hold an irrealist ontology regarding fictional en-
tities. They simply do not exist. Fictional characters are confined to their fic-
tional world (or situation); they cannot migrate to the actual world. It may 
be that real characters move (get incorporated) into a fiction. This is the case 
with so-called romans-à-clef. Yet fictional characters do not move to the ac-
tual world. Their “existence” is confined to their fictional situation.
Furthermore, the analysis of fictional discourse I’m proposing allows us to 
deal with sentences involving more than one fiction at a time and sentences 
involving both real situations and fictional ones, such as:
(42) Peter Pan is more agile than Santa.
(43) Mickey Mouse is more intelligent than Sarah Palin.
They would respectively be analyzed as:
(44) If u is an utterance of “Peter Pan is more agile than Santa” and s the si-
tuation in which u occurs, then [u is true iff Peter Pan is more agile than Santa 
in s].
(45) If u is an utterance of “Mickey Mouse is more intelligent than Sarah Pa-
lin” and s the situation in which u occurs, then [u is true iff Mickey Mouse is 
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more intelligent than Sarah Palin in s].
Nothing prevents the situation in which an utterance is evaluated from being 
composed of two different situations, viz. being a situation having as parts 
two different situations. In (42), for instance, the relevant situation is compri-
sed of two fictional situations, i.e. the Santa fiction and the Peter Pan one. In 
(43) the relevant situation is made up of the real situation involving Sarah Pa-
lin and the fictional one involving Mickey Mouse. This understanding doesn’t 
rest on characters moving from one situation to the other. It merely rests on 
the fact that different situations can be subsumed under a more general one 
and that an utterance’s truth value depends on the latter. In this “comparati-
ve” exercise there is no need for fictional characters to leave their fictional 
world. It is only when one thinks that fictional characters can migrate out of 
their fiction that one starts positing ficta and granting them an ambassador or 
passe-partout passport.
5. Conclusions
According to the account I have sketched, proper names of fictional charac-
ters need not be referential terms. In particular, they don’t have to refer to 
abstract entities or ficta. ‘Sherlock Holmes’, ‘Santa Claus’, ‘Oedipus’ and 
the like, are empty terms. As such, they have no referent. When our children 
come to learn that Santa doesn’t exist they come to realize that there is no one 
out there bringing presents on Christmas Eve. They don’t start believing that 
although Santa doesn’t exist there is an abstract entity or a fictum. Abstract 
entities don’t bring presents. Utterances containing empty terms get evalua-
ted vis-à-vis a fictional situation. To be sure, in the Sherlock Holmes stories 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ stands for Sherlock Holmes. But in saying that in a story a 
name stands for a fictional character we do not commit ourselves to the view 
that the fictional character exists or that the fictional name refers to a non-fic-
tional entity, a ficta or what you want. We can thus embrace Frege’s view and 
claim that names like ‘Santa Claus’, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Oedipus’ are 
mock proper names. And they are mock proper names insofar as they lack 
reference, i.e. insofar as the name-using convention ends in a block. All we 
are saying is that in a fiction a proper name works as-if there were a referent. 
In a fiction proper names for non-existing entities are used to enhance repre-
sentations and thus to trigger emotions etc. in the audience. They are not used 
with the intent to pick out a referent.
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The general moral we can bring home is that fictional discourse mirrors 
non-fictional discourse. Both in non-fictional discourse and in fictional dis-
course one can explicitly specify the situation/fiction vis-à-vis which a given 
utterance is evaluated or one can leave the latter implicit. The various truth 
conditions proposed here make this clear. And the analysis proposed is fully 
noncommittal. Nowhere in our semantics are we committed to abstract en-
tities or ficta as the referents of fictional names. The utterance of a fictional 
sentence or a meta-fictional one is made true/false by the very same “reality”. 
That is, the utterance of a fictional sentence, like a meta-fictional one, is true/
false iff in the relevant fiction (or myth) the relevant character does or does 
not satisfy the properties we ascribe to him/her in that specific fiction. We do 
not have to assume, though, that our characters, although they don’t exist in 
our world, exist as abstract entities or in some Meinongian universe. We can 
safely remain ontologically parsimonious. Our world is already too crowded 
and inhabited by too many people.
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